Human beings are not entirely selfish, but have various values that bear, often in opposite ways, upon the decisions they take. Values can be argued about rationally, and may be changed in the light of argument; they underlie the aims and objectives we set ourselves, the interests we have, and the needs and wants we recognise. Some of our values we share with other people, but not others, and different forms of association have different decision-procedures in consequence. Some are centralised, but where there is considerable divergence of values held, we have a decentralised decision-procedure in which agreements are reached, often by bargaining. These form the model of the business transaction.
In a famous passage Adam Smith stresses the importance of selfinterest in economic relations:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their own advantage.
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Although there is some truth in this, it is far from being the whole truth. During the early years of my life I was fed entirely by the benevolence of others, and I owe my education also, in very large measure to the generosity of benefactors now long dead. Often when stranded by the roadside, passers-by have stopped and taken time and trouble to help me loosen a nut, mend a puncture, reconnect a throttle cable. In foreign countries local inhabitants will go out of their way to set the stranger on the right road, often at considerable inconvenience to themselves. Throughout my life I have been the beneficiary of other men's benevolence, and without their good offices I should have been often in dire straits. I have been fortunate, but not peculiarly so. Other people have had parents who loved them, and provided them with the necessities of life. Other people have been the recipients of the benefactions of a previous age. At times we have received a helping hand, and may recollect having been ourselves of service to some fellow human being. Concern for others is what makes us human, and we most of us from time to time respond to the needs and wishes of others with no thought for our own advantage.
Nevertheless, Adam Smith had a point. We are conscious of our own self-interest because we are aware of ourselves as individual selves, each one with a mind of his own, peculiarly concerned with his own actions and their consequences. Indeed, it is the fundamental criterion of personal identity that an individual person can make up his mind for himself, differently from anybody else.
2
If you and I are to count as separate persons at all, it must be the case that you do not have to agree with me in every respect. Our interests can diverge. And they not only can, but do. Each of us has a special concern with his own future freedon action, not necessarily shared by others. Although, as will be argued, we do not have to be selfish in our choices, we are different selves, each one a decision-maker in his own right, making his own decisions in the light of his own assessment of their value as seen from his own point of view. We constantly have to take decisions. Sometimes the decisions are straightforward, but often there are considerations on either side, for and against a particular action, and it is a difficult matter to ponder them, and decide which considerations are the more weighty. With many considerations there is no doubt that they are relevant, and little dispute about which way they point. We all agree that promises should be kept, valued customers appeased, old employees cherished, profits sought: what is difficult to decide is how much weight to put on these considerations when they conflict. If a valued customer has fallen out with an old employee who has been unwarrantedly rude in return, do I sack the old employee or lose the custom? How frank should I be about my company's deficiencies? Should I continue to honour a contract after coming to suspect that the goods are being shipped to a Third-World dictator who will use them to make poison gas? We differ in our priorities, one man stressing the sanctity of contracts, another the sanctity of human life and the awfulness of governments. When after deliberation we arrive at a decision, we cite in justification the considerations that supported it, and passing over, and usually forgetting, those that militated against it. Our account after the event makes the decision seem much easier and more inevitable than it really was. By citing only the arguments on one side, we give the impression that they were conclusive, and that all we had to do was to subsume the particular case under some more general code which laid down unambiguously what in such a situation was to be done. But codes, though valuable, as we shall see, do not and cannot cover every case. 3 Often cases have some features that would suggest applying one principle, and other features hat would suggest applying another principle, and the point at issue is to decide which; and on this point codes tend to be silent.
Our reasoning, therefore, is not, as it appears in retrospect, deductive, citing some principle enshrined in a code, and subsuming the particular case under it, but "dialectical", in which we have arguments and counter-arguments, prima facie cases and objections to them, the objections themselves being sometimes rebutted by further considerations. Typically at the end of our deliberations, we have not come across a conclusive argument, which leaves no §1.2 room for further doubt, but only one that carries the day in the absence of further considerations. Other things being equal, we conclude that one course of action is better than the other, but recognise that other things may not be equal, and if so, we may have to reconsider our decision. But we have to decide. We cannot afford the luxury of an academic suspension of judgement. In the world of practical affairs decisions have to be taken, almost always under conditions of imperfect information. We are quite likely to be wrong, and our mistakes may cost us dear. But it is not given us amid the pressures of practical life to have certainty that what we are doing is the right thing. We only know that we have to decide, and that not to decide is in fact to decide, and nearly always to decide badly.
We Businessmen do not often talk directly about the values on which their business activities are based. They talk more readily about aims and objectives, missions, ideals, interests, strategies, priorities and targets. These words are used in a number of different, sometimes overlapping, ways. They all have the important logical feature that they are "non-privative", that is, one person's having them does not preclude another's having them too, in contrast to material objects, which are "privative", that is, one person's having them does preclude another's having them too-they are private to him, and his having them deprives anybody else's having them too. We can share values, objectives, ideals, without either of us having less, than we would if we did not share them; whereas if we share some cake with each other, we each have less. I cannot have my cake and give it, whereas I can give you an aim in life and still have it myself.
We can draw rough distinctions between the terms, some being more general than others, some more focused. 'Mission' refers to the underlying purpose of the business; for example, the mission of a pharmaceutical company may be to serve the community by providing more effective drugs to improve health-and to obtain a good return on the shareholders' investment.
The word 'objective' is widely used in business, but is open to philosophical niggles; 5 the word 'aim' can be used instead, but, together with 'objective' carries the suggestion of aiming at some particular end result at some particular time. This is sometimes the case, but not always. Some of our values are realised not by bringing about a particular state of affairs, but by maintaining some general condition. Instead of attempting to achieve an aim, we look round and hold ourselves in readiness to take whatever steps are needed to counter adventitious alterations in the situation, and restore the desired sate of affairs.
6 We aim at victory, but having achieved that we seek to maintain peace. Peace would be an ideal, as would harmony between people and nations, self-fulfilment, the flowering of artistic or literary culture. Our usage is fluid. Except in the case of interests, no great harm results from our using these words imprecisely, or in some other sense. The important thing is that they can be shared by more than one agent, and issue in action. The word 'value' will be used in this book as a general term to cover all such shareable reasons for action.
7 Shared values are the basis of joint action,' . and communities are able to act together on the basis of the values they have in common. What will be of crucial importance for the argument of this book is the distinction between those communities that share relatively many values, and can reach fairly simple decisions about how to act, and other associations where there is a much greater divergence of values with only rather few being held in common, with corresponding complications in the way decisions can be arrived at. 6 See Sir Geoffrey Vickers, The Art of Judgement, London, 1965, pp.31-35; and J.R.Lucas, Responsibility, Oxford, 1993, §10.1, pp.205-207. 7 [Alternatively, leave out last sentence, and start next thus: 'Shared values, are the basis of joint action, to revert to the earlier term, this is smoother, but we may need to reinforce the special use of 'values' as a term of art.] §1.3
Values differ from material objects not only in their logical shape-in being non-privative, or shareable 9 -but in metaphysical status. Many thinkers have thought that they have the same reality as tables, chairs and mountains, and that we should all acknowledge the same values, and it is only due to failure on the part of individual agents that they do not recognise them. In the ancient world Plato believed in a uniform set of absolute objective values, and in this was followed by the Stoics, who believed in a natural law determining what were the duties of each man in his station, and by the Jews, who believed in a divine law which laid down exactly what the people of the Covenant should do in each situation. The moral law, which according to Kant a man of good will would strive to implement, was similarly objective and absolute; and this is how morality is thought of by most modern people.
But morality thus conceived has always had its critics. As portrayed by Plato and the Stoics, it has seemed cold, impersonal and hard. Jesus castigated the moral Jews of his own generation as whited sepulchres, whose external behaviour belied an unruly self-assertiveness and insensitivity to others in their inner nature. The uniform morality o f Kant was criticized by Hegel as being inflexible and by the existentialists as denying the authenticity of moral choice. Many moral people seek to impose their values on other people, and seem to be more motivated by self-hate than by brotherly love;
10 we often sense that if they love their neighbour as themselves, their neighbour is going to be in for a bad time. Modern radicals are quick to denounce authoritarian morality, and many protagonists of the liberal democratic state defend its liberalism from the stand-point of profound scepticism about absolute values-since there is no saying whether an action is right or wrong, the State should not presume to interfere with what the individual is minded to do.
There is much force in these criticisms. The monolithic set of absolute values seems to leave no room for individuality. Each of us is, on that view, simply an agent of the moral law, who ought, in any given situation, to be doing exactly the same as anybody else. The only way he can be different is by failing to do his duty. But we want to be different. We think of ourselves as unique individuals, not as clones, identical units for realising an externally imposed set of moral values in their actions. But, just though the criticisms are, the critics' overall position is untenable. In the ancient world the great critics of the Stoics-the Epicureans-were unable to formulate a coherent rationale of action; the modern sense of the word 'epicure' shows how the original concern for the human values of freedom and friendship expressed by Epicurus himself degenerated into the sensual gratification of the hedonist. Plato described the decay of morals and the resurgence of the self in the eighth book of The Republic. As men abandon the whole-hearted devotion to the Form of the Good, they turn instead first to the worship of their image-the pursuit of honour or kudos-and then money, and then permissiveness, and finally, having expelled all values from their nature, become possessed by a demonic self-assertiveness which renders them autistic, incapable of friendship or trust, and in perpetual fear that others will do unto them as they are prepared to do unto them. The twentieth century has proved Plato all too prescient; Hitler, Stalin, and a host of lesser dictators have shown how moral nihilism engenders homicidal madness.
11 We cannot live in a value-free world. If everything is permitted, then nothing is worthwhile, and our life becomes a perpetual search for divertissement to relieve our underlying ennui, as we seek to kill time until time kills us.
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Many people sense the inadequacy of the critical sceptical position for failing to provide an alternative sense of moral direction. There has long been an undercurrent of criticism-though muted during the years of Nazism and Communism-of Western-style political economies for their lack of an inspiring rationale, and the somewhat selfish materialism they seemed to engender. Obviously, if the choice was between American capitalism and Russian communism, American capitalism was the less bad alternative. But many have found themselves uninspired by it. Much as people like to have jeans and hamburgers and consumer durables, such wants are relatively ephemeral, and cannot provide long-term satisfaction. In any case, scepticism is an inherently weak foundation on which to base any defence of freedom-if there are no values I am bound to acknowledge, there is no reason why I should limit my freedom of action in order to respect the rights of other people; I am liberated from the obligation to be a liberal and to respect the rights of others. And so many people feel that if this is the only alternative to an authoritarian insistence on absolute values, it is to the latter we must return.
But it is not the only alternative. Jesus criticized moral legalism, but explicitly disavowed any intention to sweep away the moral law. Martin Buber rejected the nihilism of existentialism, and replaced it with a new concept of the value of other people, which required the individual to adopt an "I-Thou" rather than "I-it" behaviour towards them. There can be values without their all having to be established a priori and the same for all men.
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An artistic analogy can illuminate. An artist works within a tradition, and needs to observe some constraints on how he expresses himself, or he will be unintelligible to the onlooker, reader, or listener. But a creative artist does not merely work to a formula. He adapts, modifies, improvises. Occasionally, but only occasionally, he may contravene some canon hitherto accepted. A writer must observe the grammatical and syntactical rules of his language, but can none the less have his own individual style and may occasionally coin a new word or breach some standard grammatical rule. The Impressionists and the Fauves painted very differently from their predecessors and gave new interpretations to the portrayal of landscapes and people; yet, though bitterly attacked by some art critics at the time, they were still within our artistic tradition, and the scenes they painted were still recognisable. Beethoven broke some of the eighteenth century rules of musical composition, but abided by many more. The music of Bach and Beethoven is played on the same instruments, with the same scales, and within a limited range of rhythms, but their styles are not at all the same.
Each individual is in his own life like an artist, sometimes not highly original, sometimes not very creative, but individual none the less. There are some canons of behaviour that we all need to conform to, but within them there is a wide latitude of interpretation, and different people fulfil themselves differently, each according to his different capabilities and ideals. I do not have to do the same as you in order to be doing well. I may do my thing and you yours, and we may both be doing well. Not that anything goes.
CHECK MS for possible reference
Just as we can criticize an author, composer, painter or sculptor, so we can criticize an individual's actions. I have made many a mistake, and you sometimes rue your actions. The fact that I decided to do something does not mean that it was the right thing for me to do, any more than the fact that you decided in a comparable situation to act differently proves my decision to be wrong.
On this view of values, they are much less external than Plato supposed, and not at all impersonal. Instead of existing out there, entirely independently of us, they are recognised by their appeal to us, and in the way we seek to realise them. But at the same time they are not subjective.
14 I can be wrong. However sincerely and confidently I believe that I ought to preserve the smallpox virus from extinction, I may be mistaken. It makes sense for you to say that I am wrong about my moral convictions in a way that it does not make sense to say I am wrong about my tastes. There, I am the final authority: if I believe that I like strawberries, you cannot, logically, gainsay me. But the logic of value judgements is such that it is logically possible for me to be wrong, and hence I am not the final authority on them. Fallibility precludes subjectivity, that is, if I am to be proved fallible in my actions or beliefs, there must be an external reference point against which that fallibility can be judged. Furthermore, our values are not only fallible, but can be changed or corrected; that is, they are corrigible. You can not only say that I am wrong, but sometimes persuade me. I am open to argument. I am always ready to maintain that I am right, and sometimes, though only occasionally and reluctantly, I am prepared to admit that I was wrong. Although, quite rightly, we stick to our settled convictions, and do not lightly abandon them, even in the face of serious objections, the possibility of our changing our mind is never ruled out absolutely. Values, although not external, quasimaterial objects, are none the less objective. Although at any one 14 The word 'objective' is often used as a contrast to 'subjective', but has other uses too, and in particular carries connotations of being something material. If we make out that values are material objects, as Plato is supposed to have done, we expose ourselves to easy refutation. John Mackie, Inventing Right and Wrong, Penguin, 1977, argues that values must be subjective, since they are clearly not anything like material objects. And although it is important to maintain that values are objective rather than subjective, this is something that has to be argued for, not smuggled in by verbal sleight of hand. It follows that the values we hold at any one time are dynamic. Our views can change, as we develop a better understanding, and have to change in at least minor respects, as we face situations in which we cannot meet the demands of two conflicting values, and have to decide their relative priorities. The requirements of freedom and justice can conflict, and sometimes we abridge freedom for the sake of justice-as when we hold the accused in prison before trial-and sometimes abridge justice for the sake of freedom-as when the guilty escape conviction by invoking a right to silenceand similarly in the life of each individual his values evolve as he encounters difficulties and resolves them. If values are, as we claim, in some sense objective and subject to rational discussion and interpretation, with different people acknowledging different values, which they realise in their actions and their lives, important consequences follow. In the first place, freedom is itself a value, in as much as it is the condition for people to realise values.
15 Although sometimes for good reason we abridge freedom, sometimes to prevent harm to others, sometimes to secure justice, or some other common good, sometimes even to save someone from his own wrong decisions, nevertheless there is a general presumption in favour of freedom as an underlying human value.
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In the second place, if we view values from the other person's stand-point, we shall be tolerant of his choices independently of our endorsing them, and even when they are wrong. The fact that he has made a choice does not show that it is the right one, but does show that it is his; and although on occasion we may criticize it, and tell him that it is wrong-if he asks our views on it, for instance-often we shall respect his choice, and go along with him, accepting him, warts and all, as the person he is, and not some other person conformed to a world of forms or moral canons, who ought to behave as we think he should. In line with this, we shall use the word 'value' throughout in a descriptive sense, referring to the values people actually espouse, not what they should.
Thirdly, as already indicated, many different associations and relationships will be possible on the basis of the different sets of values held in common by their members. In some there will be relatively many shared values, and only rather few not held in common. In others there will be relatively few shared values as the common basis, and the emphasis will be on the significant differences between associates. A proper understanding of these will prove fundamental for economics and decision-making in business generally. Those engaged in business often talk about their interests. It is a useful concept, but its logic is not well understood, and often gives rise to serious confusion. Interests do constitute reasons for acting, but, unlike most other values, are assignable: there is always a party or parties to whom the interests belong. We can always ask 'Whose interest?', but not 'Whose truth?'
Interests have the important, but confusing, feature that they can be used in both a third-personal and a first-personal, sense. In the former sense we speak of something's being in one's interest, in the latter of one's being interested in something. There are important differences between these two uses of the term. In the third-personal sense I can impute interests to other people. I can look after some one else's interests, taking decisions or putting forward arguments on his behalf. I impute interests to him, assuming that he acknowledges certain values, his life, his health, his liberty, his reputation, his property, his prospects, simply on the basis of his being a person like the rest of us. I do not need to consult him.
17 Often I cannot-there is not time, or I am having to take decisions in his absence-and sometimes it would not be tactful. as when I am putting someone forward for promotion, but know that he is likely to be passed over; I do not want to raise his expectations unrealistically, but urge his merits, doing the best I can for him. I can do this, because I can reckon, without asking him, that more money or greater prestige is what he would like, and without wanting his promotion for myself, can see it from his point of view, and make the judgement he would make. Similarly, the doctor or the solicitor acts in the interests of his patient or client because neither is in a position to know what his interests are, and the doctor or solicitor is. (There is a tension between the interests ascribed to a man third-personally and the values he actually avows first-personally. The third-personal imputation and the first-personal avowal can conflict, and sometimes do. He may actually want to do something which is against his interests: he may want to go and be a medical missionary in equatorial Africa, at some risk to his health and certain damage to his career prospects. Or he may want to lie abed in the morning, and to smoke and drink, again at some risk to his health and certain damage to his career prospects.)
19 These two senses of the term give rise to two different doctrines. Paternalism is logically possible if interests are construed third-personally. I, or Plato's Guardians, or the Gentlemen in Whitehall, can know best what is good for you, without consulting you, and even in defiance of your expressed opinion. You may think that cigarettes are good for you, and that it is in your interests to smoke forty a day, but I know better, and acting in your interests, put a tax on tobacco, and establish No Smoking areas everywhere. But if interests are construed first-personally, then the liberal doctrine that each person is the best judge of his own interests is necessarily true. You may think that I ought to be interested in Mozart, but if I deny being keen on Mozart, never go to concerts or operas, never play him on my music centre, you cannot know better than I that really I am interested.
It is easy to confuse the two senses. Many liberals hold that a man is necessarily the best judge of his own third-personal interests. But whereas I am necessarily the best judge of whether I am interested in Mozart, I am not necessarily or reliably the best judge of whether it is in my interests to smoke, to invest my savings in an off-shore company specialising in leisure centres, or to serialise my autobiography in the Sunday Times. At best it could be only a rough and ready generalisation that most people most of the time were better able to judge their third-personal interests than any §1.4 actually available third person. But there are many exceptions. Sometimes we have to say of someone that he is his own worst enemy, and may try for his own sake to thwart his self-destructive plans: we can act against a person's own express wishes in his interests. With children we regularly do, and sometimes with adults also, and perhaps rightly.
Third-personal interests have the further important feature that they carry connotations of self-interest. They are ascribed on the basis of the person concerned being someone whose view systematically differs from the views of other people, and hence the interests ascribed are those that separate him from other people: his life, his health, his reputation, his wealth. We expect each person to value such interests highly, and while we sometimes take care to consider the interests of others, we also suspect that a person's judgement may be biased by his interests. Hence the rules that a person should "declare his interest" before joining in deliberations, and that in some cases where a conflict of interest may arise, a person affected should take no part at all, or else put all his personal affairs into a "blind trust" before taking up public office.
The confusion of the two senses of interest has, as a consequence of this further feature, another unfortunate effect. It colours all talk of interests with a tincture of selfishness. My concerns with my future ability to act, and hence with my life, health, liberty and property, are ones that I necessarily have, and others have only contingently if at all. But my concerns for Plato's philosophy, Bach's music, Christian Aid, or the environment, are not in any way self-centred. It would be quite inappropriate to declare them before joining in a deliberative assembly. Yet they also are my interests. They may move me much more than financial ones.
The confusion infects much of business and public life. [It is nearly a tautology that I always pursue my own interests, if we take 'interest' in the first-personal sense-my choices reveal what my real priorities are: but it does not at all follow that, as is often made out, I always act out of self-interest, seeking to further those interests that can be ascribed to me in a third-personal sense. because I have no property that might be affected. I have no right to be heard, and in time past such busybodies were not heard, and counsel for the Department of the Environment would sum up by claiming that all the objectors were motivated by self-interest, and the Department alone had the public interest at heart. But on the other view I have an interest, because I am interested in the neighbourhood, and have a view about how it should be treated. But then, if I do make a submission, is it a merely interested one which can be reasonably discounted as merely the expression of a private interest, not to be allowed to obstruct the public interest? [Similarly in wage negotiations the two concepts of interest are often confused. It is in the third-personal interests of employees to receive a fair wage for what they are employed to do, but often what they are actually seeking, and have a first-personal interest in getting, are levels of wages or compensation which would make the business uncompetitive, and deny employment to themselves and others in time to come. A wise negotiator for a Trades Union may settle for less than his members want, going against their avowed first-personal concerns, but acting in their real thirdpersonal interests.]
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We need to disentangle the different strands of argument involved in the concept of interest, and to be very cautious in using the word, and to take particular care not to accept the common assumption that because in economic activity we are all pursuing our own interests, it follows that we are all necessarily being selfish. It is helpful to keep in mind those cases where someone in pursuit of a first-personal interest he has adopted argues against some third-personal interest he can be assumed to have: for example, the Treasury official arguing against a pay claim put forward by a civil service union; he is representing the public interest in keeping national expenditure down, but he will be financially better off if he loses, and the pay claim is granted. In time past we could mark this distinction by saying that he was acting disinterestedly (that is, not self-interestedly, not with regard to his third-personal imputed interests), but not that he was uninterested (that is, not bothering to find out relevant facts, not trying to argue the case effectively).
22
21 This is Michael's wage negotiation example: I am not sure if this is the right place for it-?perhaps in ch.6(Employment) 22 In recent years people have been using 'disinterest' and 'disinterestedly' to indicate lack of interest, something done without engagement or commitment-a sloppy usage to be deplored and strenuously resisted.
Rather than disentangle, we are tempted to use a linguistic knife, and say simply that there are two entirely distinct senses of the word, and insist that his real third-personal interests are what we know he needs not what he thinks he wants, which are merely first-personal interests, analogous to wants. But that is a mistake. It denies the etymology of the word; and as we shall see later, 23 cut off from its first-personal root, the third personal concept withers and dies. Interests ascribed to me by others do not interest me unless by and large and in general I recognise them as concerns that grab me. Needs I do not want are ones I will not own. §1.5 Votes and Vetoes disk 368 Votes.tex
Associations are based on the values held in common by their members, and the nature of the association and its decision-procedure will vary according as to whether there are relatively many values held in common, or only relatively few. Even where there are many values held in common, it may be difficult to reach agreement about what ought to be done, and as the range of values held in common diminishes, the difficulty increases. Sometimes we can talk it over and form a consensus, but often not everyone is completely convinced. It may be possible to find a compromise, which everyone is prepared to go along with, though not thinking it really the best course. All too often, however, no compromise is available which everyone is really happy with, and then we must reach a decision in some other way. The decision may rest with a single person, the father of the family, the boss of a business, the caudillo in a South American republic; or with some group of dominant males, such as the gerousia in Ancient Sparta, or the barons in mediaeval England; or, in democracies, with everyone having the vote, and a simple majority being decisive. In all these cases we can see the association as having a centralised decision-procedure by means of a vote, with the vote being possessed by different people in the different cases.
In modern democratic theory it is often assumed that if everyone has a vote, then a simple majority should be binding, but this fails to accord to each individual a full recognition of his individuality, and can be very unfair. A vote, even if the individual has one, is an inadequate safeguard, since he always may be outvoted on some issue of great importance to himself, though of much less concern to others: others may decide by a large majority that the happiness of the greatest number will be maximised if I am always given the night-shift, and never take my holiday over Christmas and the New Year. They say they are sorry for me, but evidently not nearly so sorry as I am at the prospect of never being able to meet anyone new, and not even to be with my family when they are all together. It is my life: I ought to have a decisive say about what I do.
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The only way to meet this difficulty, inherent in any centralised decision-procedure, is to give each person concerned a veto. Unless all the parties concerned are agreed, no decision is reached, and the transaction does not take place. The customer does not buy the goods, the workers go on strike, the peasants do not bring their produce to the market.
To exercise such vetoes, however, is costly; and in many associations where whole-hearted agreement is not possible, rather than have no agreement at all, we strike a bargain. Whereas an agreement has an internal logic and coherence of its own, and is seen as the best way of realising values we all espouse, a bargain trades off quite separate values in order to put together a joint package that each will buy, though for quite different reasons. Bargains are the typical way of reaching decisions in associations in which the values of the parties are significantly different, or in open conflict; whereas some centralised decision-procedure is appropriate in those associations, such as business enterprises or Trades Unions, where there are many values held in common. In them a consensus is often found, but in addition there is some underlying willingness to go along with a communal decision, even against one's own inclinations or better judgement. §1.6 §1.6 Models disk 368 Paradigm.tex Two paradigm models of association have emerged.
25 One is based on there being many shared values, and only rather few not held in common, with a centralised decision-procedure for coming to an agreement which is generally accepted as binding: the other, conversely, on there being relatively few shared values as the common basis of association, with the emphasis on the significant differences between associates, where the striking of a bargain is the way to come to an agreement. Although neither model is fully realised, and there is a wide spectrum of intermediate cases, nevertheless, the two models focus on characteristic features of social interaction, and help us discern the underlying rationale of the way decisions are taken.
Neither model is an extreme, pure case. No association can exist if its members have no values in common, and are in total disagreement with one another. This follows simply from the definition of an association, though the consequences that flow from this definition turn out to be quite considerable.
26 And just as one party is never in complete disagreement with another it is doing business with, so we are never perfectly of one mind with one another. No association, not even the most united of families, not even the most dedicated monastery, has its members having absolutely all their values in common: it is, as we have seen, 27 part of the criterion for being a separate individual that one can make up one's mind for oneself, differently from everybody else, and this being so, each individual has a necessary concern with his own future freedom of action, which is only contingently of concern to others. Even if we do not compete for money or women, we aspire to achieve, and seek the opportunity of achieving great things. Sons would like to emulate their fathers, novices dream of one day being abbot, the junior accountant of beoming finance director. The whole team rejoice when they win, but I even more if I scored the winning goal, or my hat trick made me the man of the match. Man does not necessarily or always act only from self-interest, and may care greatly for the interests of others: but he is necessarily interested in himself as an agent who has to decide what actually to do, and must have a special concern for those actions for which he is responsible. The old Adam is with us yet as autonomous agents, though not invariably selfish ones. 
